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 Steven Toms and Qi Zhang 
 
Marks & Spencer and the Decline of the British Textile Industry, 
1950-2000 
 
 
From the end of the Second World War, British clothing retailers, most notably Marks & 
Spencer (M&S), exercised an increasing domination over the domestic textile industry, which 
to some extent arrested its decline.  The paper uses financial and archival evidence to 
examine the distribution the costs and benefits in the M&S vertical network. It shows that 
these benefits became less tangible for textile firms from around 1985 in the face of lower 
cost overseas competition. The paper charts the visible and invisible evolution of network 
management, demonstrating that retailer/producer collaboration evolved from a bilateral 
vertical partnership model, to a hybrid version that retained partnerships with leading 
suppliers and the emphasis on domestic sourcing, but which also facilitated offshore 
production.  
 
Since 1945, staple domestic industries in western economies have been replaced with global 
production networks. In the UK, the cotton textile industry, then the textile industry 
generally, declined in the face of increasing overseas competition. Survival strategies were 
based on restructuring and concentration. Post 1960 there was a period of rapid 
transformation in which cotton was absorbed into vertically structured textile conglomerates.
1
  
Notwithstanding these changes, decline continued, and, as protection was phased out, fabric 
and apparel manufacturing faced similar threats, although the rate of decline and strategic 
response depended on relative position in the vertical production chain. Such responses 
included an alternative survival strategy based on vertical partnerships led by retailers and in 
                                                 
1
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particular, a dominant clothing retailer, Marks & Spencer (M&S).  
The UK example of a declining industry being sheltered by a dominant retailer offers 
unique insights for several reasons. First, it presents a potential meso, or network level, 
source of competitive advantage within the macro context of decline and deindustrialization. 
Whilst acknowledging the opportunity created by restructuring, the literature attributes 
continued decline to the absence of stable demand conditions required for efficient vertically 
integrated production and a failure to integrate production and marketing. 
2
 Alternatively, 
where a downstream hub firm, such as a retailer, can organize constituent firms to achieve 
lower cost relative to purchasing outside the network, value transferred from supplier to 
buyer is non-zero sum, with risk shared between network partners.
3
 These advantages are 
achievable where local suppliers offer greater flexibility and shorter lead times.
4
  
Second, and related, such competitive advantage depends on the success and 
sustainability of the lead firm’s marketing strategy. M&S’s close links with UK based 
suppliers allowed it use consumer ethnocentrism
5
 to enhance its “buy British” marketing and 
ethical stance.
6
 Where consumers believe domestic labor practices are superior and have 
greater regard for domestic over overseas labor, retailer support for local manufacturing 
capacity may underpin effective marketing, as in the case of US apparel industry. The 
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 2 
“Crafted with Pride” textile alliance enlisted Walmart to support domestic manufacturers in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, and enjoyed some temporary success.
7
 Where effective, as 
this article demonstrates, such strategies can create and share the rewards of competitive 
advantage in upstream supplier networks, suggesting a possible model of successful adaption 
of Chandler’s “visible hand” model and limits to the spread of specialized modular 
production suggested by Langlois’s “vanishing hand” hypothesis.8  
Third, the literature suggests that textile firms supplying chain stores had higher sales 
growth and suffered lower contraction in employment
9
 and that the M&S relation allowed 
stable and more efficient longer production batches,
10
 at least up to the early 1980s. The 
strategy also meant however, that the textile industry remained larger than it might have 
been, either in the absence of M&S altogether, or without M&S’s continued success, creating 
a 1990s parallel of the over-expansion of cotton textiles before 1914, and the consequent risk 
of precipitous decline.
11
 As a leading textile industry analyst pointed out: “M&S was the very 
lifeblood of the UK textile industry and yet it was the cause of its death.”12   
The empirical contribution of the paper is to examine the long run evolution (c.1950-
2000) of these trends and relationships, adding to literature dealing with M&S’s strategy, 
including its response to the significant loss of market share in 1998,
13
 and evaluating the 
wider impact on the UK textile industry, emphasizing the relationship between production 
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and marketing. To contextualize and explain these trends, the paper first reconsiders the 
literature on the decline and concentration of UK textiles and the origins of the M&S supplier 
strategy. Using contemporary and new archival evidence,
14
 it then explains the development 
of the M&S supplier relationship. To quantify the apparent benefits and costs of supplying 
M&S, the extent and persistence of risk and profit differentials for M&S suppliers are 
compared with the rest of the UK textile industry and with M&S itself.
15
 The methods 
exercised by M&S in its supplier relationships, including offshoring decisions, are also 
evaluated. These decisions were taken in the context of macro level relaxations of world 
trading rules, and consequent pressures on M&S. In response, M&S developed new ethical 
sourcing principles.
16
 These are examined with reference M&S’s relationship with supplier 
firms Courtaulds and Claremont Garments, during the establishment of a new facility in 
Morocco, and associated processes of corporate restructuring culminating Courtaulds’s 
takeover of Claremont in 1998. A final section concludes M&S’s impact on the British textile 
industry and the challenges of global competition for retailer-supplier networks. 
 
UK Textiles and Marks & Spencer 
Once Britain’s leading export sector, textiles, and particularly cotton textiles, declined 
continuously after 1920. Rising imports replaced declining exports as the main threat after 
1955, coupled with the expansion of man-made fibers.
17
 Courtaulds’s took over the remains 
of the cotton industry in 1964, whilst further mergers rapidly concentrated the fabric sector. 
In 1973, the UK government entered the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA), thereby offering 
Courtaulds protection, in addition to ongoing regional assistance, during the period of 
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rationalization
18
 The consequence was an increase in productivity [1963-1973 (72.4%)] with 
an associated decline in employment (29.2%), driven by investment in automation (open-
ended spinning and shuttle-less weaving) and synthetic fabrics.
19
 However, the gains were 
unsustainable, partly due to poor integration with marketing and distribution.
20
  
Manufacturing concentration was partly intended to increase bargaining power with 
large retailers like M&S.
21
 Integration and investment in technology by Courtaulds and other 
large firms including Viyella, Carrington and Dewhurst, had not guaranteed standardized 
orders for larger production runs, creating high, uncompetitive overheads.
22  For a small 
group of firms at first, and an increasing proportion subsequently, M&S provided an 
alternative survival strategy.  
 For many years, M&S was regarded as one of Britain’s most successful companies, 
due in part to the close relationship it cultivated with its suppliers.
23
 As the remainder of the 
textile industry declined, surviving firms were increasingly dependent on supplying to 
retailers.
 24  
There were important reasons for the increased power of retail. Wholesalers 
declined and imports penetrated fabric and ready-made clothing markets.
25
 Retailers 
undermined manufacturers’ bargaining power by applying British branding to goods sourced 
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abroad. With some exceptions,
26
 manufacturers lacked marketing and creative capacity, 
whilst they faced high risk from small changes in inventory adjustments by wholesalers and 
retailers.
27
 A further reason was new legislation, including the prohibition of resale price 
maintenance, enacted in 1964.
28
 As a consequence, retailers encouraged suppliers to 
specialize in standard garments and fabrics for the mass market.
29
 Finally acquisitions of 
M&S suppliers by larger groups, in tandem with rationalizations, increased net dependency 
on M&S.
30
 
Almost from its inception, M&S fostered close partnerships with its suppliers. Dating 
from the 1920s, M&S sought direct links with suppliers to bypass the Wholesale Textile 
Association (WTA), a secretive organization of merchants that aimed to resist encroachments 
of manufacturers and retailers. Direct links allowed M&S to impose its own quality controls 
through co-operation with individual firms.
31
 Marcus Sieff initiated the policy, which was 
subsequently overseen by Simon Marks and led by Eric Kann and the Merchandise 
Development Department. It was successively directed by Chief Executives Derek Rayner 
and Richard Greenbury, with M&S directors going to “great lengths” to support suppliers.32 
Their policies were intended as “support for British industry” and to “pursue mutually 
rewarding long term relationships with suppliers.” 33  From the 1960s, M&S provided 
consulting services to suppliers (plant layout, equipment, staff training). For Corah, the 
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Leicester based knitwear firm, M&S offered bulk orders to undercut wholesale price, 
reinvesting the difference in improving quality. M&S employed Swedish consultants to 
advise Dewhirst on quality improvements.
34
 To avoid financing expensive inspection 
systems, resulting in high proportions of rejects and “seconds” M&S insisted its suppliers, for 
example Dewhirst, invest in statistical process control methods.
35
  
So important was M&S that by the 1980s it could claim that without it, significant 
sectors of UK textile manufacture would not exist.
36
 Partly as a consequence of increasing 
M&S dominance, there were further rationalizations in manufacturing in the 1970s and 
1980s, although import penetration was also a factor.
37
 M&S responded in 1984-1985 with 
new investment in a specialist co-ordination department, to accommodate supplier ranges 
with suggested modifications from M&S selectors. Shorter lead times allowed M&S to 
introduce three fashion seasons instead of two, which although undermining suppliers’ scale 
economies, was counterbalanced by reductions in inventory and forced mark downs. M&S 
invested in expensive Gerber cutters to feed a network of satellite sewing factories.
38
 In 
specific sub-sectors, such as shirts, the M&S policy of supporting British manufacturers was 
the only reason for their viability.
39
 By 1989 M&S controlled approximately 16% of the 
British clothing market.
40
 M&S’s position helped ensure that retailers’ brands dominated 
over manufacturers’ brands in ratio of 85:15, in terms of total clothing sales. In continental 
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Europe the ratio was exactly the reverse.
41
 In 1995 M&S’s share of the total contract market 
of £5.3bn was 78% supplied by UK factories and 22% by imports; its competitors’ usage was 
86% from imports and 14% from the UK. One leading textile analyst concluded that to 
survive in the 1990s, a firm had to be an M&S supplier.
42
 
The UK textile sector was thus closely aligned to the fortunes of M&S, and to 
decisions taken by M&S executives. Although never entirely visible, the hand of M&S 
decisively determined the fate of its suppliers. It took a proprietary interest in “its factories” 
and progressively shrank the number of suppliers.
43 Further relaxation of world trade rules, 
pressurized M&S to change strategy,
44
 which in theory meant sacrificing co-ordination and 
trust-based advantages embedded in the long-term partnerships for production cost efficiency 
gains. Consequently, in the 1990s, an argument based on cheaper cost began to gain ground. 
Moreover, M&S’s close relationship with apparel led to a neglect of fabric, which could be 
more easily located offshore. Even so, it risked losing control of the overall product quality, 
which in turn impacted on design.
45
 From the 1980s, M&S increasingly pressurized its 
suppliers to source overseas, including Courtaulds and Dewhirst, which had begun to develop 
suitable expertise. Other major M&S suppliers, like Baird and Stirling, lacked the access to 
import facilities necessary to enter the offshore processing trade.
46
  
Chairman and chief executive Greenbury
47
 believed that some shift overseas was 
inevitable, although there were sharp divisions of opinion within the company, reducing the 
firm’s actual capacity to carry out the policy. Greenbury worried about response times of  
remote supply chains and the company’s image with customers. He needed to reconcile 
                                                 
41
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cheaper overseas sources of upstream fabric and textile commodity production with the 
flexibility and proximity offered by UK garment manufacturers.
48
 To evaluate these 
alternatives, and the hybrid strategy that M&S subsequently attempted, the next section 
presents new evidence on relative profit and risk in the M&S network. 
 
Risk and Profit in the Vertical Network 
As the network hub firm, M&S’s policy involved balancing reward and risk for suppliers. 
Thus it transferred significant risk to the subcontractors, whilst suppliers obtained the benefits 
of the network arrangement through managerial liaison. Rather than offer a particular margin 
on production cost, it offered price points based on market conditions, which suppliers would 
then have to match.
49
 Main suppliers, for example Baird, sub-contracted work to smaller 
suppliers, with M&S providing financial guarantees in the event of liquidation of the 
contractee.
50
 In effect, these were fixed price contracts, implying that all risks arising from 
market variance were transferred to the upstream supplier.
51
  
M&S also provided temporary loans, calling off stocks or varying credit terms and 
discounts where suppliers had potential difficulties.
52
 To cement relationships, M&S invested 
in the equity of its suppliers. For example it owned shares in many of its suppliers, including 
Corah and Nottingham Manufacturing Company (NMC).
53
 When Dewhirst launched a 
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market listing in 1972 to fund new investment, it was directly assisted by M&S.
54
 Dewhirst 
informed M&S of preliminary financial results and changes to senior management.
55
  
These arrangements involved genuine efforts by M&S to share risk with suppliers. 
For example it provided finance for experimental machinery purchases at Dewhirst aimed at 
productivity improvements that would benefit both parties.
56
 Where factories were closed to 
rationalize production, M&S provided assistance towards closure costs on a case-by-case 
basis.
57
 In August 1985, Baird agreed to a restructuring plan at M&S’s instigation. The plan 
was a response to capacity constraints on the M&S autumn program involving the 
reorganization into product groups, led by executives known and trusted by M&S. The 
revised structure allowed M&S flexibility in determining shifts in production between 
different clothing types. Detailed management accounting data, by product group, was 
provided to M&S for review.
58
  
Table 1 about here 
 
The consequences of risk sharing for firms within the M&S network are shown in 
table 1. The table shows risk profiles of five M&S clothing suppliers and twenty-five non-
M&S suppliers whose shares were traded for at least six years in the period 1988-1999.
59
 
Using monthly observations, stock market risk measures were calculated for each sample 
sub-group. Comparative figures for average beta and R square show that changes in M&S 
supplier’s returns corresponded closely with, and were to some extent explained by, general 
stock market movements. Non-M&S suppliers meanwhile, had lower betas and R square 
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averages, suggesting that their return variance was attributable to more firm specific effects. 
At the same time, total variance of return was much higher, suggesting that these firms were 
more vulnerable to trading conditions in specialized markets that were difficult to diversify. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Comparing accounting rates of return, there were also large differentials for M&S 
suppliers, shown in figure 1. M&S suppliers earned significantly higher rates of return 
compared to non M&S textile firms consistently in the period 1949-1984. During this time 
the average return from M&S suppliers was 22.1% compared to 11.9% for non M&S firms, a 
premium of 10.2%. M&S suppliers also had lower return volatility, confirming the results in 
table 1.
60
 After 1984 the differences became less discernible. M&S continued to provide its 
suppliers with similar levels of return, but non M&S suppliers also improved their relative 
performance. Following the restructuring of the early 1980s, surviving companies were able 
to use new investment to capitalize on a rapid expansion of the domestic market.
61
 Even so, 
between 1985 and 2000, the M&S umbrella offered a net benefit. Although return volatility 
increased for all firms, as table 1 illustrates, total risk was still lower for M&S suppliers.
62
  
For a substantial period, including, as figure 1 suggests, a short window during the 
early 1990s, dependence on M&S was created competitive advantage for UK manufacturers, 
which made M&S suppliers attractive takeover targets. Through this process, the M&S 
supplier base was steadily consolidated. In part this was due to activity by Coats Viyella, 
which through a series of takeover transactions, became larger, but also progressively 
                                                 
60
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increased its dependence on M&S. Acquisitions included Carrington Viyella (1982), F 
Miller, (1984), NMC (1985), Coats Paton (1986), Tootals (1991) and Corah (1994).
63
 As a 
consequence, Vantona, supplying 20% of its output to M&S in 1984 became Coats Viyella, 
supplying 50% by 1991.
64
 Supplier concentration in the early 1980s suggests that figure 1 
trends should be interpreted cautiously, as these larger firms did not immediately develop 
high dependency bi-lateral relationships with M&S and retained significant capacity outside 
the M&S umbrella.
65
 For this reason, the pattern of profitability of the M&S supplier network 
more closely followed the rest of the industry after 1985. 
M&S supplier performance before 1984 is all the more outstanding when 
international trading conditions are factored. UK unit labor costs in textiles were comparable 
to European competitors such as Italy, but substantially higher than the US and much higher 
than North African countries such as Morocco and Egypt.
66
 These differences did not 
necessarily imply that UK textiles should have contracted in the absence of MFA protections. 
The higher quality of the European workforce was widely acknowledged.
67
 Further, in the 
early 1980s, UK firms benefited from a shift to shorter supply and lead times from retailers, 
including M&S and but also new competitors such as Next. Similarly in Italy, Benetton 
matched supply to short run changes in demand using Electronic Point of Sale technology 
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and warehouse automation, which tended to benefit European producers rather than the 
developing world.
68
 
Before 1994, international trade rules boosted the advantages of local sourcing 
strategies for retailers, including M&S. The MFA protected developed country markets from 
cheaper labor sources through quotas, Bangladesh being an exception. Successive British 
governments continued these EU-led protection policies through four renegotiations of the 
MFA up to 1991.
69
 However, some manufacturers, for example Bodycote, regarded the 
removal of the MFA as an ‘outward processing’ opportunity for offshoring low value 
production such as garment stitching from pre-supplied fabric.
70
 In the 1990s Mediterranean 
North African countries benefitted increasingly from tariff free EU market access under 
preferential trade agreements.
71
 The 1988-1994 Uruguay Round led to textiles falling under 
the jurisdiction of the World Trade Organization. An important part of the wider process, the 
Munich summit of July 1992, signaled the end of MFA quota protection for UK firms.
72
 The 
resulting Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) specified a ten-year phase out of the 
MFA beginning in 1995.
73
 For all firms, the 1992 announcement and the MFA phase out 
after 1995 can be clearly discerned in figure 1.These changes represented a major threat to 
M&S’s differentiation strategy based on UK supplier partnerships.  
Figure 2 shows the profitability of M&S compared to its suppliers. For almost all 
years M&S profits were greater, but the difference between M&S suppliers and non M&S 
suppliers in figure 1 suggests M&S was prepared to share a significant proportion of its 
                                                 
68
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excess profits within the supplier network, thereby creating long run stability.
74
 The removal 
of resale price maintenance in 1964, which may have further shifted the balance of power in 
favor of multiple retailers,
75
 did not apparently affect the distribution of profit and risk within 
the M&S vertical network. Again, the effects of the MFA phase out can be discerned, partly 
in a widening gap between M&S and supplier profitability. The fall in M&S profits, in 1998, 
was delayed compared to the more immediate effects for its suppliers. The trends suggest that 
M&S began to protect its position by undermining some features of supplier collaboration 
such that supplier profits suffered before an equally serious and corresponding collapse for 
M&S some years later. 
The reason for the poor results for M&S after 1998 was the rapid rise of competitors 
such as Next, Gap and Zara.
76
  They could potentially to compete on design and price, by 
sourcing cheaper overseas suppliers. Zara’s business model was based on rapid customer 
focused adaption of style within season, through a vertically integrated supply chain based on 
a network of small Spanish co-operative firms, with lower end bulk and longer shelf-life 
products outsourced internationally.
77
 Zara thus provided a template business model which 
M&S could potentially adapt.  
Parallel trends in the supplier network increased the feasibility of such a model for 
M&S. In the period leading up to the ATC, UK textile firms had also begun to source more 
of their production overseas, and from 1996, this became much more pronounced.
 78
 
According to press commentators, the threatened introduction of a UK minimum wage 
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provided further incentive.
79
 Some suppliers, such as Baird, had already been using offshore 
suppliers for many years, for example basic Portuguese sourced Twill.
80
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Also, as noted earlier, there were many examples of M&S procedures underpinning 
trust in the supplier network. Taken together, however, the trends in figures 1 and 2 suggest 
that distributional justice was an important reason for the build-up of such trust.
81
 Before 
1984, M&S redistributed the benefits of its high street dominance to its supplier network. 
After then, as M&S supplier relative profitability dwindled,
82
 M&S increasingly relied on 
procedural mechanisms. By September 1998 it had adopted its Global Sourcing Principles 
(GSP),
83
 designed to replicate the procedural superintendence previously applied to UK 
suppliers to a radically relocated supply chain.  
The mid 1990s were a crucial transition stage in M&S supplier relations. M&S now 
began to encourage its suppliers to set up their own production overseas.
84
 As the MFA was 
phased out in the early 1990s, M&S could not easily guarantee profits in its network, nor 
could procedural templates developed over decades with UK suppliers be easily refashioned 
in countries like Morocco. By 1992 M&S already had experience of working with UK 
suppliers to source goods from the Far East.
85
 In 1996, the stated intention of all M&S 
                                                 
79
 The Times, 11 Sept. 1996. 
80
 M&SCA HO/5/1/235, Memorandum, 15 Aug. 1985. 
81
 The evidence complements Nirmalya Kumar, "The power of trust in manufacturer-retailer relationships." 
Harvard Business Review 74 (1996): 101-103, who provides specific examples of distributional justice (the 
perceived fairness of the outcomes received) distinguishing from procedural justice (the perceived fairness of 
the powerful party's process for managing the relationship) in the M&S-supplier relationship. 
82
 Coats and Charnos complained of inadequate returns on investment through supplying M&S in the 1990s; 
M&S imposed cuts in suppliers’ margins in 1984, 1991 and 2000 (Chapman, Hosiery and Knitwear, 261, 331). 
83
 M&SCA A04/76, Global Sourcing Principles, “Holding Statement,” Sept. 1998.  
84
 Johnson, “Marks & Spencer,” 3-4. 
85
 HCPP, 231, Trade and Industry Committee, Memorandum by Marks & Spencer plc (HK3) (London, 1992). 
The countries used were Hong Kong, China, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. 
 15 
suppliers, with the encouragement of M&S was to shift production overseas.
86
The policy 
absolved M&S from investing directly in overseas purchasing networks where it lagged its 
competitors.  
Meanwhile, M&S passed the responsibility for overseas sourcing to its suppliers in 
the event of negative publicity, whilst benefitting from access to cheaper supplies.
87
 A typical 
exchange was initiated by union leader Des Farrell, who accused M&S of encouraging 
suppliers to use overseas labor, stating: “Marks & Spencer is a national institution and in the 
eyes of the consumer its image is one of a retailer of quality clothing made in Britain. We 
urge it to think again and to look at ways or encouraging manufacturing in the UK.” A 
spokeswoman for M&S responded: “We have set out our targets and it is up to our suppliers, 
who are independent businesses, to decide how they will achieve theirs. That may mean that 
they decide to source more from overseas.” 88  As the evidence below suggests, these 
businesses were far from independent, but nonetheless the quotation reveals the potential 
public relations benefit for M&S of using UK suppliers to source overseas. 
Throughout the 1990s M&S tended to reduce the emphasis on its support for UK 
manufacturers in public disclosures. As early as 1989, the company referred to its expanding 
international base, whilst commenting on its continued support for investment by British 
firms. Before 1995, the chairman’s statement paid tribute to suppliers and usually quantified 
the amount of UK manufactured merchandise it sold. For example the 1992 report referred to 
the “unique” relationship and that M&S “continued to support British industry” and bought 
£4,533m of British goods, four fifths of total purchases. 
89
 The 1995 statement was the last to 
quantify M&S’s contribution along these lines, but also referred to an “expanding 
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international supply base.” 90  From 1996 there were only generalized references to 
international networks of suppliers. Phrases such as close partnership were still used. An 
example of the more generalized form of reporting was in the 1998 chairman’s statement. 
Greenbury stated: “I would like to pay tribute to all suppliers of goods and services who have 
worked closely with us in partnership to develop the business. Once again they have done an 
excellent job and their continued investment and increased commitment to supplying us 
augers well for our combined futures.”91 
  The consequence of this policy was to reduce UK sourced goods from 80% to 70% in 
the period 1991-1998.
92
 Meanwhile, M&S’s long term relationship with suppliers depended 
on stable business conditions and M&S’s continuing dominance of the high street. After a 
significant fall in profits in 1998, M&S pressurized suppliers to shift more production abroad, 
whilst overstocking in M&S led to falls in supplier share prices.
93
 After M&S adopted its 
new GSP, there was a strategic review of supplier contracts in summer of 1999.
94
 McKinsey 
conducted the review and advised M&S to narrow and globalize their supply chain, using 
only suppliers who could manufacture garments from start to finish.
95
 Although based on 
outside advice, according to M&S, rationalization could not have been achieved without 
supplier co-operation.
96
 M&S completed the program by 2002, transferring £1.5bn of 
production overseas, leaving 70% UK sourced.
97
 
Notwithstanding the shift overseas, M&S still closely controlled its suppliers. As 
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noted earlier, Courtaulds and Dewhirst were prepared for increased pressure from M&S to 
source overseas once the M&S Hong Kong initiative had failed. As early as 1979, M&S and 
Courtaulds corresponded on the potential advantages of offshoring production. Courtaulds 
CEO, Sir Arthur Knight suggested that integrating low wage sources of supply should be part 
of the longer-term dialogue between the firms.
98
 In 1981, Courtaulds constructed Chelco as a 
joint venture with Morocco’s Office for Industrial Development and Moroccan private 
investors. The Moroccan model imported raw fibers taking advantage of tax breaks and then 
re-exported based on specifications laid down by Courtaulds’s European partner, in this case 
Mothercare and British Home Stores (not M&S). Benetton used a similar strategy.
99 In 1996 
Coats Viyella’s relocated its Rainhill shirt factory to Mauritius, in close consultation with 
M&S. Greenbury was “incensed” when M&S was “dragged into the dispute” over the 
closure.
100
 Even so, M&S insisted on being consulted on strategic changes carried out by 
supplier firms. When Noel Jervis was ousted as Courtaulds Textiles CEO in 1996, Greenbury 
rebuked Eccles, the Chairman, for not informing him in advance.
101
  
In summary, such interference was the price of the financial advantages that accrued 
to suppliers in the M&S network. Sharing profit and risk allowed the UK textile sector to 
invest and modernize, and to receive financial and managerial assistance to operate profitable 
contracts within the network. Nonetheless, M&S ensured that the supplier bore the ultimate 
risk. In the difficult conditions of the 1990s, M&S became more active in the governance, 
management, and restructuring of its supply network. As the case of Courtaulds Textiles and 
Claremont Garments illustrates, M&S orchestrated takeover transactions affecting its supplier 
network, resulting in further concentration and decisions to offshore production. 
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Claremont Garments, Courtaulds Textiles and M&S 
As M&S concentrated orders on a smaller group of suppliers, some, including Courtaulds 
Textiles, Claremont Garments and William Baird, became sole suppliers of certain products. 
Others, including SR Gent, Dewhirst and Coats Viyella supplied multiple products in 
competition with other suppliers.
102
 From 1990 to 1998 the annual value of clothing supplied 
to M&S by four suppliers, Baird, Courtaulds, Coats-Viyella and Dewhirst, rose from 
£867.2m to £1,235m.
103
  
An important part of the concentration strategy was to exploit scale and scope 
economies in the supplier cost base. Once manufacturers had covered their fixed costs, small 
increases in volume led to large profit increases, notwithstanding price freezes or even 
reductions. For example in the 1992-1993 “outstanding value” campaign, M&S was able to 
improve its own profits by 25% and those of its suppliers.
104
  
The history of Claremont Garments exemplifies important characteristics of the M&S 
supply chain. Claremont was formed by a demerger of the manufacturing side of Alexon 
Group in 1991.
105
 Although Claremont had its own stock exchange listing, it sold 97% of its 
output to M&S.
106
 Claremont’s strong financial performance following the demerger 
mirrored the benefits of the M&S link, whilst Alexon, whose portfolio was based on the 1988 
acquisition of Ellis and Goldstein, one of Britain’s best performing companies, suffered poor 
sales and declining profits by direct retailing of brands in high rental locations.
107
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Claremont’s strategy was to acquire more firms and thereby increase the range of 
goods sold to M&S. In June 1992, Claremont took over J&J Fashions, another M&S supplier, 
with the agreement of M&S, paying £26.75m partly funded by a rights issue. Two months 
later in August 1992 it paid a further £2m for another M&S supplier, Alexander Milnes, 
allowing some diversification into corporate clothing.
108
 In March 1994 Claremont acquired 
Magellan Industries for £43m in a share for share deal, extending its M&S range to include 
lingerie and swimwear.  The company invested heavily in manufacturing efficiency and 
computer aided design (CAD), allowing rapid creation and review of on screen samples, 
which combined with the latest printing technology, promoted the adaptability required by 
M&S.
109
 Claremont enhanced design capability by hiring top fashion talent,
110
 and funded its 
investments from M&S contracts, which offered increased volumes that more than 
compensated for cuts in margins.
111
 
In the early 1990s, Claremont established manufacturing sites in Morocco and 
Romania,
112
 and set up an international sourcing department. In 1995 M&S began sourcing 
coats and jackets in Lithuania and Slovakia. Following a 10% fall in sales, Claremont 
announced a restructuring program, concentrated on fewer sites and a joint venture in 
Morocco. In 1996 it closed a UK factory at Pollockshaw near Glasgow and disposed of 
Spennymoor sports kit manufacturer, Avec, followed in 1997 by its Stockton-based supplier 
to Next, Bellrise. Overseas sourcing increased to 15% by 1997 and was set to increase to 
20% in the following year. Notwithstanding the opening of overseas capacity, the Glasgow 
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closure was part of a rationalization program costing £7m, with jobs transferred to other UK 
factories.
113
  
Claremont’s establishment of Moroccan subsidiary operations was a particularly 
important development that impacted on M&S’s relationship with its supplier network. One 
such investment was “DEV1” in Casablanca. Although a Claremont factory, DEV1 was 
inspected by M&S staff in 1994.  M&S’s resulting profile of DEV1 had revealed that the 
factory conformed to M&S safety and Claremont operational standards and that Claremont 
would now invest in the factory. The factory was regarded in the inspection memorandum as 
inefficient, but nonetheless suitable to supply garments destined for M&S. The factory 
employed 1135 workers on a basic wage of 1,600 Dirhams (dh) per month; equivalent to 
£119, which for a weekly shift of 45 hours was the equivalent of a 61p per hour average, and 
therefore close to the official Moroccan minimum wage.
114
 M&S rated the factory, which had 
a minimum age requirement of 18, as “Grade A”. Notwithstanding low wages, the 
memorandum noted that in China and Eastern Europe, labor costs would be 25% lower.
115
 
The DEV1 factory subsequently became Claremont MAROC and then, following the 
Courtaulds takeover of Claremont in 1998, Courtaulds MAROC and was the subject of the 
Sunday Mirror ‘Made in Morocco for Marks and Spencer’ investigation in March 1999, that 
detailed the relocation of production from north eastern England to Morocco, where 
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Claremont had raised the number of factories to ten and alleged the hand of M&S behind the 
resulting labor exploitation.
 116
  On 12
th
 March 1999, the M&S corporate press office issued a 
holding statement advising store managers how to respond to the report.
117
  
Although the Sunday Mirror piece attracted negative publicity for M&S, and indeed 
for Courtaulds, there is clear evidence that, when sourcing overseas, M&S endeavored to 
retain some features of supplier partnership, including close liaison and inspection, 
characteristic of its traditional UK supplier relationships.
118
 According to the Sunday Mirror, 
Moroccan textile wages were about £1.20 an hour and higher in the Courtaulds MAROC 
factory, indicating that although well below UK standards, wages had increased since the 
original purchase in 1994. An internal memorandum indicated that M&S staff visited the 
factory in c.1994/1995, and a technologist visited in June 1998, and reported that the building 
was basic, but health and safety standards were high.
119
 Even so, the audit checklist lacked 
any detail, merely stating that for quality systems and procedures: “Claremont operations 
manual followed.” There were no suggestions for improvement and the four year between 
visits would not have complied with the annual visits insisted upon by the M&S GSPs 
adopted after 1999, and which had been under development several years previously.
120
 
M&S’s indirect involvement in the Moroccan investments had a further dimension, 
revealed by the mechanics of the merger between its two suppliers. Continued rationalization 
costs at Claremont led to further falls in profit and on 18
th
 March 1998, the share price fell by 
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40% following the announcement of an audit investigation into underpayment of duties on 
imports from Morocco and the Far East. Claremont also  missed orders due to capacity 
problems following the earlier closures and rationalizations.
121
 M&S meanwhile was 
concerned by poor sales of Claremont stock and high levels of returns, leading to investment 
in computerized monitoring software at its 30 factories.
122
 Even so, speculation in the City 
was that Claremont would be the target of potential takeover bids from other M&S suppliers, 
including Dewhirst, William Baird, or possibly Courtaulds Textiles, with M&S being 
influential in the outcome.
123
  
Courtaulds had been a leading M&S supplier for many years. In common with other 
suppliers, it received financial assistance for trade finance from M&S.
124
 Since 1990, 
following a demerger from the Courtaulds Group as Courtaulds Textiles, its strategy was 
concentration on differentiated products in terms of response, fabric quality, design or 
branding, increased efficiency through automation and CAD, and reduced dependency on 
commodity production.
125
 Rather than broaden its international base through acquisitions, it 
relocated its production overseas whilst increasing reliance on own label products for M&S, 
such that by 1994 M&S sales accounted for 25% of Courtaulds’ turnover.126 Accordingly, it 
began to rationalize its activities closing spinning and weaving activities and investing in 
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more specialist areas like lace.
127
 Courtaulds supplied M&S with mostly lingerie, and faced 
exposure to M&S policy on margins, for example in 1991 when M&S announced that it 
would not pass on Value Added Tax (VAT) increases to customers.
128
 Rationalizations 
enabled the firm to reduce debt and invest in automation, thereby strengthening the share 
price and paving the way for equity funded acquisitions of branded clothing manufacturers 
and design.
129
 The company and its share price performed well, notwithstanding adverse 
international trading conditions caused by high UK interest rates and the falling value of the 
dollar against European currencies.
130
  
Towards the end of 1992, Courtaulds accelerated its overseas sourcing program. It 
established production in North Africa and Turkey and entered a joint venture to build 
capacity in Sri Lanka for Victoria Secret lingerie.
131
 In 1993 operations were set up in the 
Philippines and Thailand, and in 1994, the development of a fabrics plant at Nanjing.  
Courtaulds disposed of underperforming units, which was insufficient to head off a second 
profit warning in May 1996, following an earlier warning in December 1995.
132
 The larger 
firms supplying M&S, including Courtaulds, under-performed, whilst others, including 
Claremont and Dewhirst, that had been quicker to shift production overseas.
133
 In June 1996, 
the new CEO, Colin Dyer replaced announced a rationalization program, further UK factory 
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closures and more production to be moved abroad to countries where Courtaulds already had 
presence, including Morocco, Tunisia and Sri Lanka.
134
 In the recovery that followed, sales to 
M&S increased, accounting for 35% of the total by 1997, increasing to 44% following the 
takeover of Claremont in 1998.
135
 
On 14
th
 September 1998, Courtaulds announced it was in discussion with Claremont 
about a possible takeover. A day later it received acceptances from Claremont directors and 
Invesco Asset Management, giving Courtaulds 17% of share capital. Warburg Dillon Read 
published the offer document on 16
th
 September, acting on behalf of Courtaulds. The offer 
was based on the closing Claremont price on 11
th
 September of 16.5p. The offer was 18p per 
share, valuing Claremont at £10.1m. The deal was finalized, becoming unconditional on 14
th
 
October.
136
 The takeover had been encouraged by Greenbury,
137
 but M&S involvement went 
beyond that. On 16
th
 September 1998, at the early stages of the negotiations, the M&S 
corporate communications department issued a holding statement expressing wholehearted 
support for the deal between its two long-standing suppliers.
138
 A few weeks after the 
takeover, Courtaulds announced the closure of 8 Claremont factories, after M&S disclosed 
that it was encouraging its suppliers to shift production overseas. In September 1998, M&S 
had met its top 15 suppliers to discuss cost reductions through overseas sourcing.
139
 Despite 
these changes, the Courtaulds share price remained weak, as investors deserted textiles in 
favor of dot.com firms, leading Dyer, the Courtaulds chairman, to dispose of the household 
furnishing division in March 1999.
140
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The reason for this shakeout was declining M&S high street sales. Between 1997 and 
2000 M&S’s share of the UK retail clothing market fell from 13.9% to 10.9% and the share 
price fell from 660p to 170p, representing a significant and public crisis for the firm.
141
 As 
the squeeze on M&S sales and margins continued, the pressure on suppliers intensified. The 
McKinsey review was conducted between June and October, 1999. As evidence of M&S’s 
dominance of the network, suppliers were required “to provide detailed and confidential 
information about all aspects of their business.”142  
The review resulted in the strategic decision to concentrate on a select group of with 
“international expertise,” meaning three suppliers: Courtaulds, Coats Viyella and Dewhirst. 
Courtaulds benefited from £60m of extra business per year, based on 40 factories in North 
East England, heavily dependent on M&S,
143
 meaning the two firms could collaborate on 
further offshoring decisions. Even as this deal was announced Courtaulds set about a further 
round of closures of former Claremont factories acquired in the takeover. On 24
th
 November, 
1999, the same day that the £60m deal was announced, Courtaulds announced a cost cutting 
program that involved shifting production overseas, with analysts expecting further shifts 
from the current level of overseas sourcing of 50% for Courtaulds to over 70% for all the 
major M&S suppliers, including Dewhirst and Coats Viyella.
144
  
Notwithstanding its steady shift overseas, the retention of part of the UK supplier base 
and UK suppliers with overseas subsidiaries allowed M&S to claim that UK sourced goods 
remained large relative to retail competitors and that “the vast majority of our imports are 
secured through established UK manufacturers.”145 An internal statement summarized the 
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strategy as follows: “When sourcing overseas, it is our practice to use existing UK suppliers 
to manage the process. Their long standing relationships with Marks & Spencer mean that 
they are well aware of the code of conduct we require relating to factory standards…”146 
 The decision to support Courtaulds as a vehicle for offshoring supply also damaged 
the suppliers that were dropped, including William Baird, Richard Roberts and Daks 
Simpson. For Baird, although M&S contracts were less profitable than other business, the 
firm divested its contract sales to other retailers, preferring the guaranteed volumes offered 
by M&S, which provided the basis for important investment decisions. In addition to the 19 
factories and 7,260 staff already dedicated to M&S production,
147
 only three years earlier, 
M&S had encouraged Baird to invest £4.2m in a new factory in Bridgwater. In September 
1997 M&S induced Baird to enter into a lease until September 2002, incurring rents and 
redundancy costs following premature closure, and required Baird to invest in information 
technology systems required under the General Merchandise Terms of Business and made 
bespoke to M&S requirements, in particular a £246,000 computer system.
148
 The Baird case, 
in conjunction with the evidence in figure 2 illustrates that , M&S now shared less surplus 
with its suppliers and instead of distributive justice, trust was underpinned by co-operation on 
procedures.  
Like Courtaulds and Claremont, Baird had begun the process of offshoring some 
capacity. The closure of 16 of it factories effectively ended the M&S claim of primarily 
sourcing from the UK.
149
 As with Claremont, there was a strong press reaction, and from the 
management and workforces of the suppliers. The reaction indicated a sense of betrayal and 
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the assertion of an implicit contract arising from long-term agreements formed the basis of 
legal action against M&S. M&S successfully defended its actions through the courts and 
press releases, although some damage was clearly done to the perception of trust that had 
hitherto defined the business philosophy of the firm. 
 The 1999 shakeout left only three textile suppliers, Dewhirst, Courtaulds Textiles and 
Coats Viyella. In 2000, Coats divested contract sales, including M&S business, through a 
management buy-out. Coats’s management argued that the required investment to remain 
linked to M&S no longer made financial sense.
150
 The Coats decision also indicated that the 
trust upon which long-term relationships had been built was less valuable to suppliers and 
potential suppliers, either in terms of co-operation on procedures or distribution of surplus. 
 
Conclusion 
The evidence has demonstrated that M&S operated a supplier network, which promoted 
higher profits for UK textile firms at a time of intensifying international competition. Based 
around responsive and technology driven production techniques, these relationships delivered 
advantages to both producer and retailer, and contributed to the modernization and survival 
of a significant section of UK textile manufacture. The vertical network that emerged and 
indeed strengthened in the second half of the twentieth century provides a possible alternative 
to decline in face of low cost international competition. It also represents an alternative to the 
formal and scale oriented vertical integration advocated in the literature as a response.  
An important question, which is informed by the more recent history of M&S, is how 
sustainable are such models in the future? The MFA phase out presented new opportunities 
for competitors with greater expertise in offshore processing than M&S’s domestic supplier 
network had hitherto allowed.  In response, M&S adopted a hybrid model of network 
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organization based on a two-level hierarchy. At the first level, by directly encouraging 
takeovers within its supplier base, it created a small core of UK firms, based on bi-lateral 
vertical partnerships. M&S orders provided the volumes needed to support modernizing 
investment, as the Baird, Claremont, and Dewhirst cases indicate. At the same time, it 
encouraged these main suppliers to develop arms-length outsourcing contracts with 
subsidiary suppliers, relocated in low cost countries. M&S used its direct influence in the 
governance and management of the core firms, evidenced by the takeover of Claremont by 
Courtaulds to rationalize the supply chain. It then used these suppliers to operate the second 
level of the hybrid network and subsequently reorder production offshore, organized around 
open contracting and cost based efficiencies. As the DEV1 case illustrates, savings in labor 
cost were significant whilst the transaction cost of inspection and audit were minimal.  
The potential advantages of such a strategy were first that M&S could continue 
marketing on the basis of consumer ethnocentrism whilst simultaneously accessing low cost 
overseas suppliers for upstream fabric production and generic apparel. It could also absolve 
itself of the criticism faced by competing retailers of encouraging labor exploitation in 
developing countries, whilst issuing public denials of such encouragement, combined with 
reiterations of its commitment to UK manufacturing.  The hybrid model potentially offered 
M&S the chance to remain price competitive whilst maintaining elements of consumer 
ethnocentrism in its marketing strategy, modified by a slow to evolve but much needed code 
of GSPs in response to a wave of critical comment. Achieving the correct balance between 
design led flexibility and low cost mass production poses challenges for even the most 
successful firms, as the Zara case also demonstrates.  
M&S has yet to evolve a new long-term strategy, although there are some signs for 
the future. Since the crisis of 1998 M&S has enjoyed mixed fortunes and it is too early to say 
how a strategy based on balancing ethnocentric market and cost will be resolved. The launch 
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of a new “Best of British” range by Head of Design Tony O’Connor in 2013 reverted to 
traditional style, using British fabrics, albeit to establish market niches rather than the 
traditional policy of locally sourcing the wider product range.
151
  
Summarizing the period since 1950 as a whole in terms of Chandler and Langlois, the 
hand of co-ordination was ever present within the M&S network, but its visibility varied 
according to circumstances, from public declarations of support at supplier company 
meetings to cursory and secretive audits of factories in Morocco. As demonstrated, the hand 
of co-ordination can be visible and real, but as a result of the power distribution in vertical 
networks, can accordingly choose to vanish when convenient. 
 
 
 
STEVEN TOMS is Professor of Accounting at the University of Leeds. He was joint editor 
of Business History, 2007-2013 and has published extensively on the British textile industry. 
 
QI ZHANG is Reader in Accounting and Finance at the University of Durham. His main 
research areas include asset pricing, banking and emerging markets.  
                                                 
151
 Drapers, 22 Nov. 2013. 
 30 
 
Table 1: Risk profiles of UK textile firms, 1988-1998 
 
    Beta   R square Total variance 
 N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Non M&S suppliers 25 0.57 0.53 0.06 0.05 141.42 99.62 
M&S suppliers 5 1.04 1.08 0.22 0.22 87.63 84.92 
Difference   -0.47
*** 
-0.55
**
 -0.16
***
 -0.17
***
 53.79
**
 14.7 
 
Notes:  
Beta (β) calculated solving the ordinary least squares regression model:  
Ri – Rf  = αi + βi (Rm – Rf) + εi (1); where Ri is the monthly return on stock i calculated using the Datastream 
return index (RI) at time t, RIt/RIt-1–1; Rf is the interest rate on UK treasury bills taken from Datastream; α and β 
are intercept and slope estimators; Rm is the return on the Financial Times All Share Index (FTALLSH) 
calculated using the Datastream return index RI FTALLSHt/ RI FTALLSHt-1–1; ε is the error term.  
R Square is the R
2
 statistic in model (1).  
Total variance is the square of the standard deviation of Ri – Rf where returns are expressed in percentage 
equivalents. 
***
 indicates significance at the 0.01confidence interval, 
**
 indicates significance at the 0.05 confidence interval 
using a t-test for mean differences and a signed rank test for median differences.
 
 
Sources: Datastream; MSCA supplier files. 
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Note: Return on capital defined as profit before interest and tax divided by owners’ equity plus long term loan 
capital. 
 
Sources: Return on capital calculated from data in CUCD (1949-1984) or obtained from Datastream (1985-
2000). M&S supplier sample consists of 27 firms and 485 firm/years of data. Non M&S is the average of all 
firms in the UK textile sector up to 1984 and of all publicly quoted textile companies listed on Datastream 
thereafter. 
 
 
 
 
Sources: As figure 1. 
